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- Title
FIRE INSURANCE: IMPERFECTLY REGULATED COLLUSION.
- Authors
Sichel, Werner
- Abstract
The article presents a study, which investigates the causes for a significant increase in mutual fire insurance companies' market in New York and Michigan from 1901 to 1950. An analysis of the fire insurance industry as it has gone through a succession of stages from competitive structure, to collusive oligopoly, under ineffective public regulation and on to a re-activation of competition, is presented. It is claimed that the latter has been brought about chiefly, but not exclusively, by the vertical integration of groups of carriers of fire insurance into the insurance business by the establishment and growth of mutual insurance companies. The analysis in this paper has taken place in the framework of four time periods: time period one starts when rating bureaus first began to function and ends when state regulation of fire insurance rates began. Time period two begins with this state regulation and ends when mutual fire insurance companies had made a substantial inroad on the market share of the stock companies. Time period three commences where time period two terminates and ends when stock company rate deviations from bureau rates became a strong factor in the market.
- Subjects
NEW York (State); MICHIGAN; FIRE insurance; FIRE insurance agents; INSURANCE companies; INSURANCE agents
- Publication
Journal of Risk & Insurance, 1966, Vol 33, Issue 1, p95
- ISSN
0022-4367
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/250966