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- Title
Libertarianism without alternative possibilities.
- Authors
Dolbeault, Joël
- Abstract
In the contemporary debate on free will, most philosophers assume that the defense of libertarianism implies the defense of the notion of alternative possibilities. This article discusses this presupposition by showing that it is possible to build a libertarianism without alternative possibilities, apparently more robust than libertarianism with alternative possibilities. Inspired by Bergson, this nonclassical libertarianism challenges the idea that all causation implies the actualization of a predetermined possibility (an idea shared by determinism and classical libertarianism). Moreover, it challenges the idea that free will is a mere choice between prefixed possibilities: for this libertarianism, free will is the result of a creative process of the mind—an entirely causal process whose outcome is not, however, predetermined. This nonclassical libertarianism describes the process of forming a will in a more realistic way than classical libertarianism does. Furthermore, it is not threatened by the problem of chance.
- Subjects
LIBERTARIANISM; FREE will &; determinism; POSSIBILITY; CAUSATION (Philosophy); AUTONOMY (Psychology); AUTONOMY (Philosophy); PHILOSOPHERS
- Publication
Metaphilosophy, 2024, Vol 55, Issue 2, p101
- ISSN
0026-1068
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/meta.12679