We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
A SEQUENTIAL CONCESSION GAME WITH ASYMMETRIC INFORMATION.
- Authors
Ordover, Janusz A.; Rubinstein, Ariel
- Abstract
This article examines a sequential concession game characterized by the asymmetric information about the outcome. Two players are involved in a conflict that can be resolved in only two possible ways. Each player favors a different outcome. During the bargaining phase, which lasts until some finite time, each player has the option to concede. If none concedes, the game ends at time in a way that is known to one of the players from the beginning of the game. The other player is uncertain about the outcome. Time is valuable, but each player prefers to receive his favored outcome at time than to concede immediately.
- Subjects
CONCESSION bargaining; BUSINESS negotiation; CONFLICT of interests; INDUSTRIAL management; LABOR economics; ECONOMICS
- Publication
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1986, Vol 101, Issue 4, p879
- ISSN
0033-5533
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/1884183