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- Title
DIVORCING THREATS AND OFFERS.
- Authors
Altman, Scott
- Abstract
The article suggests a means of distinguishing threats from offers that explains why it is sometimes coercive to insist on one's rights in negotiations. Disagreements starts with how to describe the alternative situation. Possibilities include the statistically likely outcome for a person in this position; the outcome to which the recipient is entitled or that the proposer is obligated to provide or not to prevent; and the outcome the recipient expects. Threats and offers differ not in the number of options available before and after but in the availability of particular important options before and after the proposal. Of course, one could define coercion and threat to include all limits on another person's options. However, it is more useful to restrict these words to those interferences that are prima facie wrongs. Because the inquiry is made in order to determine blame, the option must be something that the proposer knew would be important to the recipient. To capture corrupt proposals, a moral baseline should identify options the proposer is obligated to provide or not withdraw rather than options to which the recipient is entitled. Exploitation is benefitting at someone's expense from certain characteristics or circumstances of that person. A duty of charity differs from a prima facie duty not to make threats in its incentive effects.
- Subjects
THREATS; DURESS (Law); PRIMA facie evidence; NEGOTIATION
- Publication
Law & Philosophy, 1996, Vol 15, Issue 3, p209
- ISSN
0167-5249
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/BF00161334