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- Title
DELIKTY KORPORACYJNE W ŚWIETLE TEORII AGENCJI - NA PODSTAWIE DOŚWIADCZEŃ AMERYKAŃSKICH.
- Authors
Smoleń-Bojańczyk, Małgorzata
- Abstract
The contemporary global economy is unstable, as evidenced by cyclical crises. Almost every month we find out about the next financial scandal caused by large corporations. One of the key factors affecting volatility and crises is the change of the ownership structure of many enterprises and the accompanying separation of ownership and management. These processes led, among others, to various conflicts between shareholders and owners, described by agency theories. The purpose of this article is to show correlations between corporate/financial scandals and the agency theory. In the article, the author analysed the essence of the agency theory, its problems and evolution. To maintain objectivity this text includes the opinions of supporters as well as critics of the agency theory. In the article, there was discussed the problem of corporate frauds in the United States in the light of the agency theory, starting from Enron in 2001, through the financial crisis of 2008 and its further consequences. The analysis presented in the article shows that despite the great financial crisis no proper conclusions were drawn in the area of corporate governance. New regulations that imposed managers' responsibility did not bring the predicted effect. Regulatory and control bodies were not able to make the managers responsible for the crisis indicted. Taking into account the development of the situation and lack of managers' responsibility, we should expect a growing agency problem in financial markets.
- Publication
Vistula Scientific Quarterly / Kwartalnik Naukowy Uczelni Vistula, 2018, Vol 58, Issue 4, p202
- ISSN
2084-4689
- Publication type
Article