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- Title
Davidson on Pure Intending: A Non-Reductionist Judgement-Dependent Account.
- Authors
Hossein Khani, Ali
- Abstract
I will argue that Davidson's account of pure intending can be construed as a first-person-based judgement-dependent account of intention. For Davidson, pure intending to do φ is to make an all-out judgement that φing is desirable. On this anti-reductionist account, intention is treated as an irreducible state of the subject. I will draw a comparison between this account and Wright's and I will show that Davidson's account can be viewed as a non-reductionist judgement-dependent account along the lines suggested by Wright. I then explain how this account can help deal with various perplexities in Davidson's later view of meaning and mental content.
- Subjects
INTENTION; THEORY of self-knowledge; REDUCTIONISM; REASONING; ATTITUDE (Psychology)
- Publication
Dialogue: Canadian Philosophical Review, 2022, Vol 61, Issue 2, p369
- ISSN
0012-2173
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1017/S0012217321000214