We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Do Unions Punish Democrats? Free-Trade Votes and Labor PAC Contributions, 1999-2012.
- Authors
Jansa, Joshua M.; Hoyman, Michele M.
- Abstract
This article examines whether labor unions punish incumbent Democrats who vote for free-trade bills in Congress. We theorize that punishment is a risky strategy for interest groups that prefer one party over the other. Therefore, interest groups must be substantially affected by decline in party support to punish. Consistent with our theory, we find important differences between public- and private-sector unions in their willingness to punish. Although publicsector unions articulate opposition to free trade, they do not follow through with either deterrence (withholding contributions to send a signal) or incapacitation (withholding contributions to replace the wayward candidate with a more supportive one). Private-sector unions, specifically unions that organize trade-vulnerable industrial workers, do attempt to punish Democrats via deterrence. The estimated deterrence effect is a 6 percent reduction in contributions. This study improves on previous studies by modeling punishment across several congressional sessions and multiple trade votes. The results reveal new insights into labor's approach to declining protectionism among congressional Democrats.
- Subjects
UNITED States; POLITICAL participation of labor unions; FREE trade policy; LABOR unions; DEMOCRATS (United States); COMMERCIAL policy; PRESSURE groups; PUNISHMENT
- Publication
Political Research Quarterly, 2018, Vol 71, Issue 2, p424
- ISSN
1065-9129
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1177/1065912917738575