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- Title
Intergovernmental Conflict and Censorship: Evidence from China's Anti-Corruption Campaign.
- Authors
Zhuang, Maiting
- Abstract
I study how local Chinese newspapers report on the national anti-corruption campaign by collecting a large-scale dataset of newspaper articles, internet searches, and comments on social media. Despite greater reader interest, local newspapers underreport, and deemphasise corruption scandals involving high-level officials from their own province. Underreporting is greater when a corrupt official is well connected, and a newspaper does not rely on advertising revenue. City-level newspapers report less about corruption in their own city but are more likely to report about corruption within the provincial government. I present suggestive evidence that this type of localised censorship reduces the accountability of local governments.
- Subjects
CHINA; CENSORSHIP; GOVERNMENT accountability; REPORTERS &; reporting; ADVERTISING revenue; PROVINCIAL governments; NEWSPAPER advertising
- Publication
Journal of the European Economic Association, 2022, Vol 20, Issue 6, p2540
- ISSN
1542-4766
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1093/jeea/jvac036