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- Title
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER IN A STACKELBERG STRUCTURE: LICENSING CONTRACTS AND WELFARE.
- Authors
Kabiraj, Tarun
- Abstract
We study the question of optimal licensing contracts in a leadership structure and discuss the welfare implications. We assume that the size of the innovation is exogenous and the patent holder is a competitor in the product market. Then welfare depends on the types of contracts available and on the ownership of patents. In particular, we examine whether a leader's innovation is considered to be socially more valuable than a follower's innovation. We show that there are situations when a follower's innovation generates larger welfare. Given the private incentives for innovation, a licensing policy may induce the desired firm to win the patent race.
- Subjects
TECHNOLOGY transfer; INDUSTRIAL research; INTELLECTUAL property; PATENTS; LICENSE agreements; CONTRACTS
- Publication
Manchester School (1463-6786), 2005, Vol 73, Issue 1, p1
- ISSN
1463-6786
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9957.2005.00421.x