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- Title
Torture: banality of evil or radical evil?
- Authors
Volpato Dutra, Delamar José
- Abstract
The text aims to explore legal and moral aspects of torture. Under the legal aspect the text compares three definitions of torture: UN definition, Brazilian definition, and Spanish definition. In this regard, neither the UN formulation nor the Brazilian formulation are ideal, because the Brazilian legal definition restricts the element of action by the part of the perpetrator of torture, and the UN convention restricts the effect on the victim, given that pain or suffering should be severe. The hypothesis is that a better proposal could be linked to the Spanish Penal Code, which in its art. 174 defines torture as the submission of someone "to conditions or procedures that, due to their nature, duration or other circumstances, involve physical or mental suffering, the suppression or decrease of their faculties of knowledge, discernment or decision, or that otherwise undermine their moral integrity". The Spanish definition seems more encompassing in both aspects, on the act of the perpetrator of torture, and on the effect on the victim, since the suffering involved is not characterized as severe. Concerning the moral meaning of the repulse to torture it is intended to defend the paradigmatic character of the human right to not be tortured in at least two respects. The first aspect refers to its universalizing vocation in the full sense, since it can be extended to all sentient beings. In this regard, the prohibition of torture goes beyond the dominium of personality to advance in the direction of a domain of suffering not determined by the mask of personality. The second aspect is that the prohibition stands for an absolute right with no exceptions, precisely because of its deeper moral content. The study goes on to claim that there are good reasons for this absolute moral character of the prohibition of torture due to a fortunate coincidence that follows from utilitarianism and Kantian deontological moral theory, the two main moral theories of modernity. The text scrutinizes the effects of torture not only on the person of the tortured human being, but also on their body. Stated clearly, torture destroys two basic elements of humanity, personality and corporeality. What will be left of the human being after being tortured is, at best, a heap of sentient flesh. Maybe for this reason, language loses its significance in correlation to torture, precisely because all signification is nullified in the face of the hypertrophy of the physical body in pain, which absorbs all the sensations. Established these terms, then, the text turns on the personality and responsibility of the perpetrator of torture. The hypothesis is that if something like a moral absolute can make sense, torture will surely be one of these absolutes, so that the personality of the perpetrator of torture and his responsibility for the acts of torture can hardly be explained by the thesis of the banality of evil, as contend by Arendt, except on the proviso that the banality of evil thesis be couplet with fundamental aspects of the Kantian radical evil thesis, especially its self-deceit character. It is intended to demonstrate that the degrees of wickedness described by Kant, especially that stage of the radical evil, are the best to enter in the fullest depths of the torturer's personality. In this context all excuses evaporate, including those of legality. For the torturer, therefore, has no excuses, not even in front of his own conscience. So, the main point is to explain the act of torture, especially considering Arendt view concerning Eichmann, according to which "The deeds were monstrous, but the doer - at least the very effective one now on trial - was quite ordinary, commonplace, and neither demonic nor monstrous". For such purpose/goal, three hypotheses are raised. The first is psychological. In this view the torturer is described as perverse, as a kind of sadist. The second explanation is sociological or political. According to this approach, there is an ethos and a social context that reinforces such actions and gives them meaning. However, it seems something is lacking in these approaches. Because of the insufficiencies of the two previous perspectives a moral explanation that goes deeper into the personality of the perpetrator of torture becomes necessary. In this regards the Kantian thesis about the radical evil seems to be a good initial approach for a third view in order to explain such atrocities. Arendt is well known for defending the thesis of the banality of evil in his text on Eichmann. However, she seemed to defend, in earlier works, a more fortified conception of evil, of a radically close to demonic evil, certainly envisioned by Kant but rejected by him. However, Arendt eventually rejected this interpretative thesis of evil close to a demonic will because attributing such an extraordinary character to evil would weaken the responsibility for it. To think the act of torture as incomprehensible threatens to put it beyond any comprehension, any significance, and consequently entails insurmountable difficulties to hold their authors responsible. As Derrida recalls, it is not possible to criticize violence except in relation to a symbolic sphere that makes sense, be it law, justice or morality. Finally, the text tries to demonstrate that Arendt conception of the banality of evil can be reconciled with the Kantian formulations concerning radical evil, especially if the aspect of self-deceiving is highlighted.
- Subjects
TORTURE; CRIMINAL codes; SUFFERING; HUMAN rights; PERSONALITY
- Publication
Filosofia UNISINOS, 2020, Vol 21, Issue 3, p240
- ISSN
1519-5023
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.4013/fsu.2020.213.01