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- Title
IS MORE COMPETITION ALWAYS BETTER? AN EXPERIMENTAL STUDY OF EXTORTIONARY CORRUPTION.
- Authors
Ryvkin, Dmitry; Serra, Danila
- Abstract
Using a laboratory experiment, we assess whether increasing competition among public officials reduces extortionary corruption. We find that increasing the number of providers has no effect on bribe demands when citizens' search costs are high, but it increases corruption when search costs are low. The effect is absent in a parallel setting framed as a standard market, which we attribute to citizens using a nonsequential search strategy as opposed to sequential search in the corruption setting. We conclude that efforts to reduce search costs, such as infrastructure investments, are preferable to anti‐corruption policies aimed at increasing the number of providers.
- Subjects
CORRUPTION laws; BRIBERY; CIVIL service; PUNISHMENT; FINES (Penalties)
- Publication
Economic Inquiry, 2019, Vol 57, Issue 1, p50
- ISSN
0095-2583
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/ecin.12703