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- Title
The farsighted core in a political game with asymmetric information.
- Authors
Miyakawa, Toshiji
- Abstract
We consider a three-player-political game that modifies a weighted majority game by having farsighted players. We follow Acemoglu et al. (Rev Econ Stud 75:987-1009, 2008) in assuming that the power of each player is exogenously given but allow a winning coalition to choose any wealth distribution, as in Jordan (2006). Under complete information, the farsighted core is enlarged by the heterogeneity of player's powers. In addition, we introduce asymmetric information about powers among players and define a corresponding concept of the farsighted core under asymmetric information which is a variant of the credible core in Dutta and Vohra (Math Soc Sci 50:148-165, 2005).
- Subjects
JORDAN; POLITICAL games; INFORMATION asymmetry; GAMBLER psychology; SUCCESS
- Publication
Social Choice & Welfare, 2017, Vol 49, Issue 1, p205
- ISSN
0176-1714
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00355-017-1057-5