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- Title
CHEAP TALK AND SEQUENTIAL EQUILIBRIA IN SIGNALING GAMES.
- Authors
Manelli, Alejandro M.
- Abstract
Well-behaved infinite signaling games may have no sequential equilibria. We prove that adding cheap talk to these games "solves" the nonexistence problem: the limit of sequential equilibrium outcomes of finite approximating games is a sequential equilibrium outcome of the cheap-talk extension of the limit game. In addition, when the signaling space has no isolated points, any cheap-talk sequential equilibrium outcome can be approximated by a sequential e-equilibrium of the game without cheap talk.
- Subjects
GAME theory; SIGNALS &; signaling; INFINITE groups; ECONOMIC equilibrium; SEQUENTIAL analysis; CONVERSATION
- Publication
Econometrica, 1996, Vol 64, Issue 4, p917
- ISSN
0012-9682
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/2171850