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- Title
A puzzle about belief updating.
- Authors
Martini, Carlo
- Abstract
In recent decades much literature has been produced on disagreement; the puzzling conclusion being that epistemic disagreement is, for the most part, either impossible (e.g. Aumann (Ann Stat 4(6):1236–1239, 1976 )), or at least easily resolvable (e.g. Elga (Noûs 41(3):478–502, 2007 )). In this paper I show that, under certain conditions, an equally puzzling result arises: that is, disagreement cannot be rationally resolved by belief updating. I suggest a solution to the puzzle which makes use of some of the principles of Hintikka’s Socratic epistemology.
- Subjects
EPISTEMICS; PUZZLES; BELIEF &; doubt; THEORY of knowledge; CONSENSUS (Social sciences)
- Publication
Synthese, 2013, Vol 190, Issue 15, p3149
- ISSN
0039-7857
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11229-012-0132-9