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- Title
Incentive compatible core and competitive equilibria in differential information economies.
- Authors
Forges, Francoise; Heifetz, Aviad; Minelli, Enrico
- Abstract
Summary. If the allocations of a differential information economy are defined as incentive compatible state-contingent lotteries over consumption goods, competitive equilibrium allocations exist and belong to the (ex ante incentive) core. Furthermore, any competitive equilibrium allocation can be viewed as an element of the core of the n-fold replicated economy, for every n. The converse holds under the further assumption of independent private values but not in general, as shown by a counter-example.
- Subjects
ECONOMICS; LOTTERIES; ECONOMIC equilibrium; CONSUMPTION (Economics)
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2001, Vol 18, Issue 2, p349
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/PL00004188