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- Title
Commitment-enhancing tools in Centipede games: Evidencing European-Japanese differences in trust and cooperation.
- Authors
Krockow, Eva M.; Masanori Takezawa; Pulford, Briony D.; Colman, Andrew M.; Smithers, Samuel; Toshimasa Kita; Yo Nakawake
- Abstract
Theories of trust distinguish general trust in situations of social uncertainty from assurance-based trust in committed, longterm relationships. This study investigates European-Japanese differences using the Centipede game, in which two players choose between cooperation and defection. The game models repeated reciprocal interactions, necessitating assurance-based trust to sustain cooperation. We included game conditions offering players the option of purchasing commitment-enhancing tools to increase social certainty. Japanese participants were more cooperative than Europeans, confirming higher assurancebased trust, and also purchased more commitment-enhancing tools, demonstrating their preferences for social certainty. Purchase of commitment-enhancing tools improved cooperativeness in both groups. However, if co-players refused tool purchase, the Japanese appeared to interpret this as non-cooperative intent and cooperativeness in the respective games decreased.
- Subjects
TRUST; COOPERATIVENESS; COMMITMENT (Psychology); GAMES &; psychology; SOCIAL psychology
- Publication
Judgment & Decision Making, 2018, Vol 13, Issue 1, p61
- ISSN
1930-2975
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1017/s1930297500008822