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- Title
TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENTS FOR PERSONAL IDENTITY IN KANT'S TRANSCENDENTAL DEDUCTION.
- Authors
Mariña, Jacqueline
- Abstract
One of the principle aims of the B version of Kant's transcendental deduction is to show how it is possible that the same "I think" can accompany all of my representations, which is a transcendental condition of the possibility of judgment. Contra interpreters such as A. Brook, I show that this "I think" is an a priori (reflected) self-consciousness; contra P. Kellei; I show that this a prwn self-consciousness is first and foremost a consciousness of one's personal identity from a first person point of view.
- Subjects
TRANSCENDENTALISM (Philosophy); IDENTITY (Psychology); KANT, Immanuel, 1724-1804; JUDGMENT (Psychology); SELF-consciousness (Awareness)
- Publication
Philo, 2011, Vol 14, Issue 2, p109
- ISSN
1098-3570
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.5840/philo201114210