We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
DO NONPARTISAN, PUBLICLY FINANCED JUDICIAL ELECTIONS ENHANCE RELATIVE JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE?
- Authors
HUNTER JR., JUDGE ROBERT N.
- Abstract
Twenty-one states elect appellate judges, while the others use gubernatorial appointment, legislative elections, or merit selection plans.¹ In 1996, North Carolina changed its superior court elections from partisan to nonpartisan elections.² Partisan elections for district court judges were later eliminated in 2001 in lieu of nonpartisan elections.³ By 2004, North Carolina made the same switch to nonpartisan elections for appellate judge seats, along with a voluntary public campaign financing system for appellate judges.4 This Article compares judicial elections before and after the adoption of a nonpartisan, publicly funded election system and concludes that, while public financing was widely utilized by candidates and equalized funding, these changes have only marginally achieved their goals of reducing the influence of outside money, promoting public interest in judicial elections, and enhancing relative judicial independence. This Article also argues that any system short of selection with tenure during good behavior will compromise judicial independence.
- Subjects
NONPARTISAN elections; PUBLIC finance; JUDICIAL elections; JUDICIAL independence; APPELLATE judges; GUBERNATORIAL elections
- Publication
North Carolina Law Review, 2015, Vol 93, Issue 6, p1825
- ISSN
0029-2524
- Publication type
Article