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- Title
Are Experimental Auctions Demand Revealing when Values are Affiliated?
- Authors
Corrigan, Jay R.; Rousu, Matthew C.
- Abstract
The article focuses on experimental auctions. It says that rational agents should adjust their bidding strategies to take into account that the common value of the winning bidder signal likely is exceeding the true common value of the goods. It relates that second-price auctions may lead to inefficient allocation if the bidder has received low common value signal despite having the highest private value. It adds that value affiliation could arise in experimental auctions.
- Subjects
AUCTIONS; BIDDING strategies; BIDDERS; BID price; VALUE (Economics)
- Publication
American Journal of Agricultural Economics, 2011, Vol 93, Issue 2, p514
- ISSN
0002-9092
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1093/ajae/aaq140