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- Title
External world scepticism and self scepticism.
- Authors
Thorpe, Joshua Rowan
- Abstract
A general trend in recent philosophical and empirical work aims to undermine various traditional claims regarding the distinctive nature of self-knowledge. So far, however, this work has not seriously threatened the Cartesian claim that (at least some) self-knowledge is immune to the sort of sceptical problem that seems to afflict our knowledge of the external world. In this paper I carry this trend further by arguing that the Cartesian claim is false. This is done by showing that a familiar sceptical argument that targets my knowledge of the external world can be adapted to target my belief that I exist, along with any of my self-knowledge that I know entails my own existence. Thus, my self-knowledge and my knowledge of the external world are subject to the same sort of sceptical problem.
- Subjects
SKEPTICISM; THEORY of self-knowledge; CARTESIAN doubt; WELL-being; COUNTERFACTUALS (Logic)
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2023, Vol 180, Issue 2, p591
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-022-01910-6