We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Counterfactuals, counteractuals, and free choice.
- Authors
Lampert, Fabio; Merlussi, Pedro
- Abstract
In a recent paper, Pruss (Can J Philos 43:430–437, 2013) proves the validity of the rule beta-2 relative to Lewis's semantics for counterfactuals, which is a significant step forward in the debate about the consequence argument. Yet, we believe there remain intuitive counter-examples to beta-2 formulated with the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. We offer a novel and two-dimensional formulation of the Lewisian semantics for counterfactuals and prove the validity of a new transfer rule according to which a new version of the consequence argument can be formulated. This new transfer rule is immune to the counter-examples involving the actuality operator and rigidified descriptions. However, we show that counter-examples to this new rule can also be generated, demanding that the Lewisian semantics be generalized for higher dimensions where counter-examples can always be generated.
- Subjects
COUNTERFACTUALS (Logic); CONDITIONALS (Logic); SEMANTICS; ACTUALITY theory (Philosophy); POTENTIALITY theory (Philosophy)
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2021, Vol 178, Issue 2, p445
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-020-01440-z