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- Title
The optimal subsidization of Baptists by bootleggers.
- Authors
Shogren, Jason F.
- Abstract
Rent-seeking bootleggers have an incentive to subsidize the lobbying activities of the public-interest minded Baptists. We demonstrate that unless a certain set of conditions hold, the optimal subsidy will be positive and will provide a moral smoke screen for rent-seeking activities. Consequently, it will be extremely difficult to identify the actual level of rent-seeking from the public interest activities. Therefore, current empirical estimates may well underestimate the actual level of rent-seeking in the regulatory arena.
- Subjects
RENT subsidies; BAPTISTS; BOOTLEGGING; LOBBYING; PUBLIC interest
- Publication
Public Choice, 1990, Vol 67, Issue 2, p181
- ISSN
0048-5829
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/BF00714398