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- Title
Against Equality and Priority.
- Authors
HUEMER, MICHAEL
- Abstract
I start from three premises, roughly as follows: (1) that if possible world x is better than world y for every individual who exists in either world, then x is better than y; (2) that if x has a higher average utility, a higher total utility, and no more inequality than y, then x is better than y; (3) that better than is transitive. From these premises, it follows that equality lacks intrinsic value, and that benefits given to the worse-off contribute no more to the world's value than equal-sized benefits given to the better-off.
- Subjects
EQUALITY; PRIORITY (Philosophy); TEMKIN, Larry; DEBATE; PRINCIPLE (Philosophy)
- Publication
Utilitas, 2012, Vol 24, Issue 4, p483
- ISSN
0953-8208
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1017/S0953820812000404