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- Title
Defending the Right.
- Authors
Dancy, Jonathan
- Abstract
In this paper l consider what might be my best response to various difficulties and challenges that emerged at a conference held at the University of Kent in December 2004, the contributions to which are given in the same volume. I comment on Crisp's distinction between ultimate and non-ultimate reasons, and reply to McKeever and Ridge on default reasons, and to Norman on the idea of a reason for action. I don't here consider what other particularists might want to say; I certainly don't think that my way of doing these things is the only possible one, but not surprisingly I am interested in seeing what resources it might have to defend itself.
- Subjects
REASONING; REASON; THOUGHT &; thinking; DEFAULT reasoning; INFERENCE (Logic)
- Publication
Journal of Moral Philosophy, 2007, Vol 4, Issue 1, p85
- ISSN
1740-4681
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1177/1740468106072790