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- Title
DO RENT-SEEKING GROUPS ANNOUNCE THEIR SHARING RULES?
- Authors
BAIK, KYUNG HWAN; LEE, DONGRYUL
- Abstract
We study collective rent seeking between two groups in which each group has the option of releasing or not its sharing-rule information. First, we show that the case where both groups release their sharing-rule information never occurs in equilibrium; when the players are unevenly matched, one group releases its sharing-rule information and the other does not. Then, we select the Pareto-superior equilibrium when the players are unevenly matched. We show that, in this selected equilibrium, the underdog releases its sharing-rule information, and the favorite does not; thus, the underdog becomes the leader, and the favorite the follower ( JEL D72).
- Subjects
RENT seeking; PARETO optimum; EQUILIBRIUM; GAME theory; ECONOMIC aspects of decision making; ECONOMIC models
- Publication
Economic Inquiry, 2012, Vol 50, Issue 2, p348
- ISSN
0095-2583
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1465-7295.2009.00280.x