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- Title
Relative Concerns and Delays in Bargaining with Private Information.
- Authors
Ana Mauleon; Vannetelbosch, Vincent
- Abstract
We consider Rubinstein's two-person alternating-offer bargaining model with two-sided incomplete information. We investigate the effects of one party having relative concerns about the bargaining outcome and the delay in reaching an agreement. We find that facing an opponent with stronger relative concerns only hurts the bargainer when she is stronger than her opponent. In addition, we show that an increase of one party's relative concerns will decrease the maximum delay in reaching an agreement.
- Subjects
COLLECTIVE bargaining; CONFLICT of interests; BUSINESS negotiation; DEALS; EXOGENEITY (Econometrics); PSYCHOLOGY
- Publication
Games (20734336), 2013, Vol 4, Issue 3, p329
- ISSN
2073-4336
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.3390/g4030329