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- Title
Monotonicity violations under plurality with a runoff: the case of French presidential elections.
- Authors
Keskin, Umut; Sanver, M. Remzi; Tosunlu, H. Berkay
- Abstract
A voting rule is monotonic if a winning candidate never becomes a loser by being raised in voters' rankings of candidates, ceteris paribus. Plurality with a runoff is known to fail monotonicity. To see how widespread this failure is, we focus on French presidential elections since 1965. We identify mathematical conditions that allow a logically conceivable scenario of vote shifts between candidates that may lead to a monotonicity violation. We show that eight among the ten elections held since 1965 (those in 1965 and 1974 being the exceptions) exhibit this theoretical vulnerability. To be sure, the conceived scenario of vote shifts that enables a monotonicity violation may not be plausible under the political context of the considered election. Thus, we analyze the political landscape of these eight elections and argue that for two of them (2002 and 2007 elections), the monotonicity violation scenario was plausible within the conjuncture of the time.
- Subjects
FRENCH presidential elections; RUNOFF elections; ELECTIONS
- Publication
Social Choice & Welfare, 2022, Vol 59, Issue 2, p305
- ISSN
0176-1714
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00355-022-01397-4