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- Title
A THREE-STAGE INTERNATIONAL MIXED DUOPOLY WITH A WAGE-RISE CONTRACT AS A STRATEGIC COMMITMENT.
- Authors
OHNISHI, KAZUHIRO
- Abstract
This paper examines international mixed competition, where one domestic social-surplus-maximizing public firm and one foreign profit-maximizing private firm can adopt a wage-rise contract as a strategic commitment. The paper considers the following three stages. In the first stage, the domestic public firm can offer the wage-rise contract. In the second stage, the foreign private firm can offer the wage-rise contract. In the third stage, both firms simultaneously and independently choose and sell their actual outputs. The equilibrium of the international mixed duopoly model is discussed.
- Subjects
DUOPOLIES; WAGES; SURPLUS (Economics); PROFIT maximization; BUSINESS enterprises; BUSINESS planning; CONTRACTS
- Publication
Manchester School (1463-6786), 2010, Vol 78, Issue 4, p279
- ISSN
1463-6786
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/j.1467-9957.2009.02143.x