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- Title
Competitive outcomes and the inner core of NTU market games.
- Authors
Brangewitz, Sonja; Gamp, Jan-Philip
- Abstract
We consider the inner core as a solution concept for cooperative games with non-transferable utility (NTU) and its relationship to payoffs of competitive equilibria of markets that are induced by NTU games. An NTU game is an NTU market game if there exists a market such that the set of utility allocations a coalition can achieve in the market coincides with the set of utility allocations the coalition can achieve in the game. In this paper, we introduce a new construction of a market based on a closed subset of the inner core which satisfies a strict positive separability. We show that the constructed market represents the NTU game and, further, has the given closed set as the set of payoff vectors of competitive equilibria. It turns out that this market is not uniquely determined, and thus, we obtain a class of markets. Our results generalize those relating to competitive outcomes of NTU market games in the literature.
- Subjects
ECONOMIC competition; UTILITY theory; COOPERATIVE game theory; RESOURCE allocation; ECONOMIC demand
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2014, Vol 57, Issue 3, p529
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-014-0846-7