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- Title
The Gruesome Truth About Semantic Dispositionalism.
- Authors
Podlaskowski, Adam C.
- Abstract
The resemblance is plain to see between Kripke's Wittgenstein introducing bizarre rules such as quaddition (in illustrating the sceptical paradox against theories of meaning) and Goodman's introducing the equally bizarre grue (in generating the new riddle of induction). But the two sorts of bizarre cases also differ in interesting respects. For those familiar with Goodman's case, this similarity sparks a strong temptation to enlist to the meaning sceptic's cause key elements of Goodman's new riddle, which are missing from Kripke's case. In this essay, I characterize a natural way of doing just this, which targets dispositionalist solutions to the sceptical paradox. I also show that, despite initial appearances, this new objection to dispositionalism (the symmetry problem) is not nearly as worrisome as originally thought. The solution offered on behalf of semantic dispositionalists does require a trade-off, though, from the severe form of indeterminacy advanced by the meaning sceptic to a much milder thesis.
- Subjects
WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig, 1889-1951; RIDDLES; RESEMBLANCE (Philosophy); PARADOX; TEMPTATION; SYMMETRY; SKEPTICISM; PLAINS
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2023, Vol 38, Issue 2, p299
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-022-00517-0