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- Title
Understanding, Integration, and Epistemic Value.
- Authors
Gardiner, Georgi
- Abstract
Understanding enjoys a special kind of value, one not held by lesser epistemic states such as knowledge and true belief. I explain the value of understanding via a seemingly unrelated topic, the implausibility of veritism. Veritism holds that true belief is the sole ultimate epistemic good and all other epistemic goods derive their value from the epistemic value of true belief. Veritism entails that if you have a true belief that p, you have all the epistemic good qua p. Veritism is a plausible and widely held view; I argue that it is untenable. I argue that integration among beliefs possesses epistemic value independent from the good of true belief, and so has value veritism cannot account for. I argue further that this integration among beliefs comprises the distinctive epistemic value of understanding.
- Subjects
INTEGRATION (Theory of knowledge); THEORY of knowledge; EPISTEMICS; COMPREHENSION (Theory of knowledge); BELIEF &; doubt; PLAUSIBILITY (Logic); PHILOSOPHY
- Publication
Acta Analytica, 2012, Vol 27, Issue 2, p163
- ISSN
0353-5150
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s12136-012-0152-6