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- Title
Infallibilism, Fallibilism and Closure: Brains in Vats and Mein Herr on Maps.
- Authors
Cameron, J. R.
- Abstract
Starting point: a performative version of a fallibilist reliabilism: crediting N with knowing that p is endorsing N's belief that p as rational and hence as correct, within an epistemic community's practice which determines standards of rationality and takes achieving it as ensuring correctness reliably-regularly though not infallibly: it requires us to regard a rational belief as correct unless we have grounds for doubt. Aim: to assess from this position infallibilism based on Closure arguments, particularly of the brain-in-a-vat kind. Findings: These are invalid by our ordinary epistemic standards; and they depend on a presupposition-of-a-practice type of entailment rather than a content-entailment. Conclusion: these arguments must be seen as attacking our epistemic practice as a whole, not individual knowledge attributions. Response: but that fallibilist practice is appropriate, given the belief-reality gap (cf. the map-reality gap) and the belief-evidence gap: these gaps make absolute certainty-logical impossibility of error, as sought by BiV arguments-unattainable.
- Subjects
INFALLIBILITY (Philosophy); FALLIBILITY; THEORY of knowledge; FALLIBILISM; RELIABILISM (Theory of knowledge)
- Publication
Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences & the Humanities, 2016, Vol 107, p107
- ISSN
0303-8157
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1163/9789004312654_008