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- Title
Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting .
- Authors
Radner, Roy
- Abstract
In a partnership game, each player's utility depends on the other players' actions through a commonly observed consequence (e.g. output, profit, price), which is itself a function of the players' actions and an exogenous stochastic environment. If a partnership game is repeated infinitely, and each player's payoff in the infinite game (supergame) is the long-run average of his expected one-period utilities, then efficient combinations of one-period actions can be sustained as Nash equilibria of the supergame even if the players cannot observe other players' actions or information, but can only observe the resulting consequences.
- Subjects
BUSINESS partnerships; ECONOMIC equilibrium; PROFIT; COMBINATORICS; MATHEMATICAL analysis; UTILITY functions; STOCHASTIC processes
- Publication
Review of Economic Studies, 1986, Vol 53, Issue 1, p43
- ISSN
0034-6527
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/2297590