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- Title
Persuasion with ambiguous receiver preferences.
- Authors
Sapiro-Gheiler, Eitan
- Abstract
I describe a Bayesian persuasion problem where Receiver has a private type representing a cutoff for choosing Sender's preferred action, and Sender has maxmin preferences over all Receiver type distributions with known mean and bounds. This problem can be represented as a zero-sum game where Sender chooses a distribution of posterior mean beliefs that is a mean-preserving contraction of the prior over states, and an adversarial Nature chooses a Receiver type distribution with the known mean; the player with the higher realization from their chosen distribution wins. I formalize the connection between maxmin persuasion and similar games used to model political spending, all-pay auctions, and competitive persuasion. In both a standard binary-state setting and a new continuous-state setting, Sender optimally linearizes the prior distribution over states to create a distribution of posterior means that is uniform on a known interval with an atom at the lower bound of its support.
- Subjects
PERSUASION (Psychology); ZERO sum games; BIDDERS
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2024, Vol 77, Issue 4, p1173
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-023-01522-z