We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Do Classified Boards Deter Takeovers? Evidence from Merger Waves.
- Authors
John, Kose; Kadyrzhanova, Dalida; Lee, Sangho
- Abstract
We exploit the arrival of industry-wide synergistic merger waves to identify whether classified boards deter takeover bids. In a stylized model, we show that when target classified boards are costly to bidders, their negative effect on takeover likelihood should be more pronounced during merger waves. Using a sample of takeover bids in the United States between 1990 and 2016, we find strong evidence supporting this prediction. The results are robust to accounting for the benefits of classified boards and controlling for other antitakeover provisions. Our findings suggest that classified boards effectively reduce a firm's exposure to the takeover market.
- Subjects
MERGERS &; acquisitions; BOARDS of directors; ANTITAKEOVER strategies; SELECTION &; appointment of corporate directors; BUYOUTS; TARGET companies; TENDER offers
- Publication
Journal of Financial & Quantitative Analysis, 2024, Vol 59, Issue 2, p759
- ISSN
0022-1090
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1017/S0022109023000170