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- Title
Moral perception, inference, and intuition.
- Authors
Wodak, Daniel
- Abstract
Sarah McGrath argues that moral perception has an advantage over its rivals in its ability to explain ordinary moral knowledge. I disagree. After clarifying what the moral perceptualist is and is not committed to, I argue that rival views are both more numerous and more plausible than McGrath suggests: specifically, I argue that (a) inferentialism can be defended against McGrath's objections; (b) if her arguments against inferentialism succeed, we should accept a different rival that she neglects, intuitionism; and (c), reductive epistemologists can appeal to non-naturalist commitments to avoid McGrath's counterexamples.
- Subjects
SENSORY perception; INTUITION; MCGRATH, Sarah; ETHICAL intuitionism; PHILOSOPHY
- Publication
Philosophical Studies, 2019, Vol 176, Issue 6, p1495
- ISSN
0031-8116
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11098-019-01250-y