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- Title
SOME SCEPTICISM ABOUT MORAL REALISM.
- Authors
Goldsworthy, Jeffrey
- Abstract
This article critiques the moral realism espoused by Michael Moore and other externalist moral realists. In his article, Moore defends moral realism against various skeptical objections. One of these objections is that for practical purposes it makes no difference whether or not moral realism is true: the moral practices of realists, and of sensible skeptics should be indistinguishable. This paper argues that Moore's attempt to rebutt that objection fails. It is first necessary to identify the kind of moral realism that Moore defends. Moore is an externalist moral realists that is committed to naturalism. He rejects motivational internalism, insisting that one can know that something is morally required and yet not be motivated at all to do it. On the other hand, he holds that moral qualities necessarily provide objective reasons for action because to say that something is morally wrong is a matter of logic to say that there is a reason to do it. There are two difficulties in this position. Another difficulty for externalists moral realists such as Moore concerns not only the reasons which motivate people to act, but also the reasons for which people feel emotions such as guilt and indignation.
- Subjects
MORAL realism; EXTERNALISM (Philosophy of mind); MOORE, Michael, 1954-; ETHICS; PHILOSOPHY
- Publication
Law & Philosophy, 1995, Vol 14, Issue 3/4, p357
- ISSN
0167-5249
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/BF01000705