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- Title
The political economy of the G20 agenda on financial regulation.
- Authors
Schuknecht, Ludger; Siegerink, Vincent
- Abstract
The paper empirically examines the implementation record of international financial regulation of the banking sector. The study finds that the size of the banking sector and the presence of global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) are positively associated with a stronger implementation record. These results suggest that cooperative motives of internalising externalities, creating a level playing field and preserving financial stability play a role in explaining the implementation record. The evidence shows that this cooperative behaviour may be driven by the self-interest of global players as the positive record is particularly strong in countries where both large banking sectors and big banks are present, and where regulation only applies to large players. Sectoral concentration, bank health and the share of foreign ownership yield more mixed results with respect to their impact on implementation.
- Subjects
GROUP of Twenty; BANKING industry; EXTERNALITIES; FOREIGN ownership of stocks; PUBLIC goods
- Publication
OECD Working Papers on Finance, Insurance & Private Pensions, 2020, Issue 47, p1
- ISSN
2079-7117
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1787/87677ba6-en