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- Title
EMPLOYMENT VARIABILITY UNDER DIFFERENT MANAGERIAL COMPENSATIONS SYSTEMS.
- Authors
GERHART, BARRY; TREVOR, CHARLIE O.
- Abstract
Variability in employment levels, particularly when resulting from downsizing and layoffs, has considerable consequences for employees and organizations. Applying strategic compensation and agency theory principles to multiple years of employment, financial performance, and managerial compensation data on 152 organizations, we found that compensation design was related to employment variability through two avenues. First, organizations relying more heavily on long-term compensation incentives for managers exhibited less employment variability. Second, when groups of employees were covered by variable pay plans, their employment variability was lower.
- Subjects
PENSIONS; DIFFERENCES; ORGANIZATIONAL behavior; STRATEGIC planning; COMPENSATION management; FINANCIAL performance; LAYOFFS; EXECUTIVES; LABOR costs; EMPLOYEE training; AGENCY theory; DOWNSIZING of organizations; ACCOUNTING
- Publication
Academy of Management Journal, 1996, Vol 39, Issue 6, p1692
- ISSN
0001-4273
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/257075