We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Normative Error Theory and No Self-Defeat: A Reply to Case.
- Authors
Khuramy, Mustafa; Schulz, Erik
- Abstract
Many philosophers have claimed that normative error theorists are committed to the claim 'Error theory is true, but I have no reason to believe it', which to some appears paradoxical. Case (2019) has claimed that the normative error theorist cannot avoid this paradox. In this paper, we argue that there is no paradox in the first place, that is once we clear up the ambiguity of the word 'reason', both on the error theorist's side and those that claim that there is a self-defeat problem. Upon clarification, we also raise scepticism to what exactly the nature of self-defeat is meant to be.
- Subjects
NIHILISM (Philosophy); PHILOSOPHERS; PARADOX; THEORISTS; SKEPTICISM
- Publication
Philosophia, 2024, Vol 52, Issue 1, p135
- ISSN
0048-3893
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11406-024-00718-4