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- Title
What Logical Evidence Could not be.
- Authors
Baggio, Matteo
- Abstract
By playing a crucial role in settling open issues in the philosophical debate about logical consequence, logical evidence has become the holy grail of inquirers investigating the domain of logic. However, despite its indispensable role in this endeavor, logical evidence has retained an aura of mystery. Indeed, there seems to be a great disharmony in conceiving the correct nature and scope of logical evidence among philosophers. In this paper, I examine four widespread conceptions of logical evidence to argue that all should be reconsidered. First, I argue that logical apriorists are more tolerant of logical evidence than empiricists. Second, I argue that evidence for logic should not be read out of natural language. Third, I argue that if logical intuitions are to count as logical evidence, then their evidential content must not be propositional. Finally, I argue that the empiricist proposal of treating experts' judgments as evidence suffers from the same problems as the rationalist conception.
- Subjects
JUDGMENT (Logic); EMPIRICISM; PROPOSITION (Logic); LINGUISTICS; RATIONALISM
- Publication
Philosophia, 2023, Vol 51, Issue 5, p2559
- ISSN
0048-3893
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11406-023-00695-0