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- Title
On the Dialectical Disadvantage of the Normative Error Theorist: A Reply to Clipsham.
- Authors
Zhao, Xinkan
- Abstract
In response to the companions in guilt arguments, some error theorists have tried to defend a nihilist thesis that there truly are no normative epistemic reasons to believe, and further no normative reasons whatsoever, making them global normative error theorists. In his recent paper, Patrick Clipsham tries to adjudicate on this debate. Dubbing this nihilist response a "bullet-biting" one, he argues that sophisticated forms of this response are viable and immune from the frequently leveled charges. However, he further argues that despite its success of avoiding these charges, the nihilist response is bound to face a dialectical disadvantage, that is, it impairs the error theorist's ability to criticize the opponents. In this paper, I argue for two propositions. First, while there are viable nihilist responses, they are not or at least should not be as how Clipsham has represented them. Second, the new charge from dialectical disadvantage also fails, along with the older charges.
- Subjects
DIALECTIC; NIHILISM (Philosophy); EPISTEMIC logic; SELF-defeating behavior; GUILT (Psychology)
- Publication
Philosophia, 2021, Vol 49, Issue 2, p861
- ISSN
0048-3893
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11406-020-00236-z