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- Title
A speedy auction using approximated bidders' preferences.
- Authors
Ingebretsen Carlson, Jim
- Abstract
This paper presents a combinatorial auction, which is of particular interest when short completion times are of importance. It is based on a method for approximating the bidders' preferences over two types of item when complementarity between the two may exist. The resulting approximated preference relation is shown to be complete and transitive at any given price vector. It is shown that an approximated Walrasian equilibrium always exists if all bidders either view the items as substitutes or complements. If the approximated preferences of the bidders comply with the gross substitutes condition, then the set of approximated Walrasian equilibrium prices forms a complete lattice. A process is proposed that is shown to always reach the smallest approximated Walrasian price vector. Simulation results suggest that the approximation procedure works well as the difference between the approximated and true minimal Walrasian prices is small.
- Subjects
AUCTIONS; BIDDERS; EQUILIBRIUM
- Publication
Annals of Operations Research, 2020, Vol 288, Issue 1, p65
- ISSN
0254-5330
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10479-019-03461-2