We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Pity: a mitigated defence.
- Authors
Kristjánsson, Kristján
- Abstract
The aim of this article is to offer a mitigated moral justification of a much maligned emotional trait, pity, in the Aristotelian sense of 'pain at deserved bad fortune'. I lay out Aristotle's taxonomic map of pity and its surrounding conceptual terrain and argue -- by rehearsing modern accounts -- that this map is not anachronistic with respect to contemporary conceptions. I then offer an 'Aristotelian' (albeit not Aristotle's) moral justification of pity, not as a full virtue intrinsically related to eudaimonia but as a positive moral quality that has instrumental value in developing and sustaining a certain intrinsically valuable state of character -- namely compassion. The justification offered is mitigated in the sense that it does not elevate pity to a virtuous disposition, constitutive of the good life; yet it does offer a crucial counterweight to Aristotle's own denunciation of pity.
- Subjects
SYMPATHY; CONDUCT of life; EMOTIONS; ARISTOTLE, 384-322 B.C.; PAIN
- Publication
Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2014, Vol 44, Issue 3/4, p343
- ISSN
0045-5091
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1080/00455091.2014.941565