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- Title
Deviant Causal Chains, Knowledge of Reasons, and Akrasia.
- Authors
Strom, Gregory
- Abstract
I begin by refuting Davidson's classic account of akrasia, which turns on a purported distinction between judging p and judging p 'all things considered.' The upshot of this refutation is that an adequate account of akrasia must turn on a distinction between different ways in which the agent can make judgments about her practical reasons. On the account I propose, an akratic agent makes an existential judgment that there is some decisive practical reason to act in a certain way without also knowing what that reason is. An agent can do what such a reason requires only by deviating from the conditions under which her action would be a response to it. The possibility of akrasia is a consequence of our concern not only to perform actions that match what our reasons require but also to manifest reasons in conduct that they inform.
- Subjects
AKRASIA; PRACTICAL reason; MORAL judgment; WILL; MORAL psychology; PRACTICAL judgment; FORMAL sociology; REFUTATION (Logic)
- Publication
Topoi: An International Review of Philosophy, 2014, Vol 33, Issue 1, p67
- ISSN
0167-7411
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s11245-013-9209-4