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- Title
Partially-honest Nash implementation: a full characterization.
- Authors
Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki
- Abstract
A partially-honest individual is a person who follows the maxim, "Do not lie if you do not have to", to serve your material interest. By assuming that the mechanism designer knows that there is at least one partially-honest individual in a society of n ≥ 3 individuals, a social choice rule that can be Nash implemented is termed partially-honestly Nash implementable. The paper offers a complete characterization of the (unanimous) social choice rules that are partially-honestly Nash implementable. When all individuals are partially-honest, then any (unanimous) rule is partially-honestly Nash implementable. An account of the welfare implications of partially-honest Nash implementation is provided in a variety of environments.
- Subjects
SOCIAL norms; SOCIAL choice; NASH equilibrium
- Publication
Economic Theory, 2020, Vol 70, Issue 3, p871
- ISSN
0938-2259
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s00199-019-01233-4