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- Title
Epistemic Stances, Arguments and Intuitions.
- Authors
Serebrinsky, Dalila
- Abstract
The debate between scientific realists and anti-realists is now a classic debate in the Philosophy of Science. Van Fraassen (2002) has suggested that the positions that take part in the debate involve not only different doxastic attitudes regarding some propositions, but different epistemic stances, that is, different sets of commitments, values and epistemic strategies. The formulation of this debate in terms of epistemic stances and the voluntarist epistemology it motivates make it plausible to think of it as a deep disagreement. This kind of disagreements cannot be settled by reason alone because they lack the conditions that are necessary for arguments to work. I argue, however, that the attempts to use arguments can have an epistemic value in these contexts, as they can help reveal intuitions. I adopt the view on intuitions put forward by Chudnoff (2014), according to which they are mental states capable of motivating epistemic action. I claim that, while the attempt to utter an argument cannot convince an opponent of changing her mind, it can make her perform some epistemic actions and, thus, bring out some of her intuitions. To show how arguments can work in this way, I take as a study case one of the main realist arguments: the No Miracles Argument.
- Subjects
INTUITION; PHILOSOPHY of science; ARGUMENT; VALUES (Ethics); THEORY of knowledge
- Publication
Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 2024, Vol 55, Issue 1, p79
- ISSN
0925-4560
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1007/s10838-023-09643-8