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- Title
How Not to Argue for Selective Reproductive Procedures.
- Authors
Kittay, Eva Feder
- Abstract
Many bioethicists try to secure a moral requirement to select against disability, while wishing to avoid denigrating disabled people. Dan Brock’s arguments are representative of this attempt. Brock argues that the harm of giving birth to a disabled child when an able child could be had in its stead is a “nonperson-affecting harm.” The harm is creating a world with less opportunity and more diminishment of opportunity. I argue that the presumptions that a life with disability is ceteris paribus a worse life, and that there is an inherent badness in living with a disability are contestable and fail to provide an argument that avoids the objections that disability scholars have voiced to reproductive selection against disability.
- Publication
Kennedy Institute of Ethics Journal, 2017, Vol 27, Issue 2, p185
- ISSN
1054-6863
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1353/ken.2017.0015