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- Title
SHARING PRODUCTIVE KNOWLEDGE IN INTERNALLY FINANCED R & D CONTESTS.
- Authors
Bhattacharya, Sudipto; Glazer, Jacob; Sappington, David E. M.
- Abstract
We examine the optimal design of two-stage research and development (R & D) joint ventures. At the second stage, researchers choose R & D effort levels independently in an attempt to achieve an innovation. In the first stage, researchers have an opportunity to share endowments of productive knowledge. Initial pecuniary resources are limited, so rewards for disclosing knowledge and succeeding at the second stage must be financed from successful innovation. We derive conditions under which lull sharing of knowledge and the socially desired levels of R & D effort can be motivated, and examine the optimal incentive structure when this ideal outcome cannot be implemented: full sharing will always be motivated at the first stage, but inefficient R & D effort will be induced to foster information sharing.
- Subjects
LICENSE agreements; INDUSTRIAL property; INTANGIBLE property; LICENSED products; RESEARCH &; development; EXPERIMENTAL design
- Publication
Journal of Industrial Economics, 1990, Vol 39, Issue 2, p187
- ISSN
0022-1821
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.2307/2098493