We found a match
Your institution may have access to this item. Find your institution then sign in to continue.
- Title
Optimal taxation for democracies with less than perfect voters: A public choice perspective.
- Authors
Congleton, Roger D.
- Abstract
This paper analyzes optimal tax policy from the perspective of voters who want public policies to systematically advance their interests. Self‐acknowledged ignorance implies that voters have a practical interest in transparent and stable tax systems that allow personal tax burdens to be calculated accurately and easily. Such properties reduce voter mistakes. However, a voter's normative interests may conflict with these practical interests, because ideas about a good life or good society often support tax system complexity. Tradeoffs between these two aims of democratic tax systems imply that the optimal tax system for a democracy neither minimizes voter errors nor maximizes a social welfare function.
- Subjects
OPTIMAL taxation; SOCIAL choice; TAX incidence; FISCAL policy; VOTERS
- Publication
Kyklos, 2024, Vol 77, Issue 1, p3
- ISSN
0023-5962
- Publication type
Article
- DOI
10.1111/kykl.12356